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Dr David Whetham, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
“Are We Fighting Yet?” Can Traditional Just War Concepts Cope With 
Contemporary Conflict and the Changing Character of War?1 
 
In the ‘good old days’, the traditional view is that one knew when one was at war – it 
was declared, people would fight, one side would win, the other lose, and then the war 
would be over. In Ancient Rome, the start of hostilities might take the form of high 
ranking fetial priests casting a spear into enemy territory to demand redress for a 
wrong committed against the Republic.2 In the Twentieth Century, it might be like the 
formal declaration of war made by Britain against Germany following the latter’s 
invasion of Poland: 
 
“This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German 
Government a final note stating that unless we heard from them by 11.00 a.m. 
that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state 
of war would exist between us.”3 
 
War was considered ended in Ancient Greece when the defeated side’s lines broke 
and the fleeing troops lost possession of the battlefield. You knew if you were on the 
winning side because it was you who was being asked by the other side for 
‘permission to gather up their dead’.4 The formal surrender of the Japanese armed 
forces on the deck of the USS Missouri on September 2nd, 1945, also represented a 
clear and unambiguous full stop to hostilities, marking a clear dividing line between 
war and peace. 
It was in this context that the norms of war we are used to today were 
developed. The Just War Tradition, in the West at least, developed out of a synthesis 
of classical Greco–Roman and later Christian values, although it would be a mistake 
to consider it as a purely Western or even as a religious phenomenon.5 The Tradition 
guides normative thinking about what is and what is not acceptable, even in times of 
war. Its core ideas – that there should be limits on when the use of force can be 
considered legitimate (the jus ad bellum), and that there should also be limits on what 
and whom that force can be directed against (the jus in bello) – have found expression 
in all societies due to the recognition that they need to restrain the wars they fight in 
some way.6 While the exact details may vary a little, the core ideas are shared across 
religious and secular culture, underpinning international law. The ubiquitous nature of 
the thinking found in the Just War Tradition therefore represents something of ‘a 
common language for discussing and debating the rights and wrongs of conflict’.7 
When those norms are violated, those violations are, generally speaking, recognised 
and condemned as such. 
However, while the Just War Tradition may have historically been a useful 
guide to normative considerations regarding the use of force, things appear to be more 
complicated today. The spectrum of contemporary conflict appears to be growing and 
expanding in such a way as to challenge old notions of what it is to be at war, or even 
the idea that war is an exception to the normality of peace. While terrorism did not 
suddenly begin on 9/11 (although one might be led to believe this), events that day 
and the on-going threat and reality of mass casualty terrorism around the world have 
certainly shaped attitudes in the years subsequent to 2001. The character of conflict 
appears to be morphing in other ways too. Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense, 
described the problem when he articulated, ‘the categories of warfare are blurring and 
no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of 
destruction -- from the sophisticated to the simple -- being employed simultaneously 
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in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare’.8 Russell Glyn has suggested that the 
hybrid threat can be characterised as when ‘an adversary…simultaneously and 
adaptively employs (1) political, military, economic, social, and information means, 
and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive/criminal 
warfare methods’. This could involve a combination of state and non-state actors in 
the process.9 
Should things like on-going terrorist activity on a large scale, or hybrid war, 
perhaps involving predominantly non lethal methods such as subversion or economic 
attrition, be tackled within a war paradigm that can be considered using the normative 
tools provided by the Just War Tradition, or should it instead be considered and 
approached with something looking more like a law-enforcement paradigm? Some 
argue that relying purely on the policing paradigm is flawed as it can only really be 
applicable for ‘well-ordered societies that suffer from [only] occasional and small-
scale violence engaged in by individuals or small groups’. They argue that the nature 
and scale of the current domestic and international threat means that the war paradigm 
is therefore a better fit with current realities.10 Others argue that something in between 
or combining the two approaches is required and that such challenges can best be met 
by employing both war and law enforcement paradigms. 11  Although he was 
specifically referring to cyber attacks with political intent, Thomas Rid argues that 
this particular kind of conflict can best be considered as something in between as well 
-  ‘neither crime nor war, but rather in the same category as subversion, spying or 
sabotage, existing somewhere on the spectrum between apolitical crime at one end 
and genuine war at the other’.12 So where does this leave us? 
The reality is that despite President Obama’s statement in February 2015 -  “I 
do not believe America’s interests are served by endless war or by remaining on a 
perpetual war footing” (ironically made while seeking approval for expanding the US 
war effort) – conflict, whether it deserves the name “war” or not, appears to be the 
norm rather than the exception for millions of people.13 The US Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations, Michael Sheehan, said before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in May 2013 that the war against Al Qaeda would continue “at 
least 10 to 20 years”.14  ‘What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a 
prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign’. 15  It might not look like many of the 
conflicts in the Twentieth Century, but in terms of the scale of effort and resources in 
terms of blood and treasure dedicated to it, war it is. 
Outside of the US, the UK does not officially consider herself at war. The UK 
never officially adopted the term “Global War on Terror” and yet, the security status 
of government and military facilities around the country remain heightened and 
British troops are deployed in 80 countries around the world engaged in small scale 
training and advisory roles all the way up to major deployments in support of local 
security forces, such as the 5200 troops who were still in Afghanistan at the start of 
2014.16 The shooting of 12 journalists in Paris in January 2015 led to a controversial 
attempt to broaden surveillance powers in the UK and the Prime Minister expressing 
concerns about whether or not the country was adequately prepared for a Mumbai 
style “roving firearms terrorist attack”.17 
Is this what peace looks like now, or should this more accurately be 
considered, as apparently the US administration does, to be a state of constant war? 
Rosa Brooks is not alone when she argues precisely this when she states that 
‘Perpetual war is unlikely to end in our lifetimes…it has become virtually impossible 
to draw a clear distinction between war and not-war.’18 This matters because war is a 
situation in which states, and individuals acting on behalf of those states, are 
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permitted to carry out acts that are otherwise prohibited. This includes, of course, the 
deliberate and premeditated taking of human life, an issue highlighted by the 
arguments over targeted killings using drones.19 It also includes allowing the state to 
interfere with some of our individual rights and liberties in order to protect us from a 
known danger, whether that be travellers putting up with longer queues at airport 
security screening, accepting increased surveillance and scrutiny of our private 
communications and activities, or curtailment of certain types of association deemed 
to be of concern to the state. The detention of captured enemy combatants for the 
duration of hostilities when those hostilities may never end, is another highly 
contentious issue. 
If war is the norm, at least for the foreseeable future, then what actions and 
behaviours should be included in this understanding? Is all activity to be judged by 
the same standard? Who or what is included in the class of ‘enemy’? What counts as a 
hostile act and what are you permitted to do in response to it, or has that question 
already been answered with the assumption that one’s state is at war? The character of 
contemporary conflict is changing and this in turn raises questions about the 
suitability of normative frameworks that are supposed to govern it. Can something 
like the Just War Tradition, firmly grounded in traditional and arguably out-dated 
understandings of conflict, really cope with the realities of contemporary warfare?  
 
A week’s events in the UK in 20XX 
To test some of these questions, the next section will outline a series of events that 
might take place in the not too remote future. 
A question raised by a whistle blower organisation suggests that due to 
cutbacks in the oversight regime, the integrity of nuclear safety check data for several 
power stations must be called into question. The allegation is that expert nuclear weld 
engineers have been supplemented by trainee technicians who do not have the 
experience to be able to sign off the essential safety certificates. While the 
investigation continues into what data can be trusted, the media storm leads to the 
temporary shut down of four UK power plants, which combined with a wild cat strike 
in France by power workers (thus preventing the usual electricity sharing protocols), 
leads to rolling power cuts around the UK. 
A leak from somewhere in Whitehall, initially reported on a blog site but 
quickly picked up by the print and broadcast media, alleges that the contact details of 
an infamous bondage party organiser, currently ‘on holiday’ and unavailable for 
comment, has been found on the Prime Minister’s Blackberry. Despite angry 
rebuttals, Prime Minister’s Question Time descends into farce as the Opposition hold 
up toy handcuffs, and questions about the PM’s moral authority are severely 
damaging party discipline. 
The supermarket giant Tesco’s financial woes continue. However, a leaked 
internal auditor’s report suggests that at least 20 other Blue Chip companies have also 
been playing games with the rules regarding discount payments and the financial year 
in which they are registered for profit purposes. The suggestion that the profits of 
such a large number of pillars to the UK economy may be severely overinflated leads 
to the largest one-day fall in the FTSE 100 for a decade. The pound begins to slide as 
wider questions about the British economy begin to be asked around the world. As the 
risk appetite in the UK business world dries up, mortgage products start to be 
withdrawn from the market by key foreign-owned financial institutions, leading to 
dire predictions of another UK housing market crash. 
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Rumours about a change in the TV licensing rules lead to riots at six British 
prisons as prisoners believe their TVs are about to be withdrawn from their cells. The 
military are put on standby to assist the understaffed prison service as the riots start to 
spread in the overcrowded facilities. At the same time, a legal challenge through the 
British courts is raised by a pressure group using the Human Rights Act to challenge 
any armed overseas deployment of British troops if there is no clearly identified link 
to UK vital national interests as defined in terms of preserving the life and liberty of 
UK citizens. Confusion over what this might mean causes great angst in the Ministry 
of Defence. 
Environmental campaigners are granted an injunction to prevent the use of a 
certain type of new sonar used on British submarines due to an alleged link to the 
deaths of large numbers of endangered sea mammals. This means ignoring the ruling, 
operating at reduced effectiveness and increased vulnerability, or refitting, putting the 
UK’s continuous at sea nuclear deterrent at risk of being gapped for the first time in 
its history. In less well known developments, the Chief of the Defence Staff is 
distracted by his son’s arrest on drug possession charges after pictures of him 
apparently taking cocaine with friends at a university party appear on social media, 
prompting an on-going police investigation that is drawing in for questioning the 
children of many high profile political and military figures. 
These events are combined with another twenty or thirty other simultaneous 
political, economic or legal developments, including a walkout of transport workers 
prompted by pension reform proposals leaked to the press, positive Foot and Mouth 
results forcing an embargo on all cattle movement in the North of England, a glitch in 
the Just in Time automated stock systems at three different national supermarket 
chains leading to empty shelves and panic buying among the public, asbestos traces 
found in the Cabinet Office briefing room forcing key government decision-making to 
relocate, a death attributed to Ebola in Scotland by a returning tourist from West 
Africa leading to fears of an epidemic as everyone she has been in contact with in her 
job at a petrol station for the past two weeks need to be tracked down. Vigilante mobs 
start targeting ‘dirty Africans’ in the streets, and a sewage pumping station error 
dumps two million gallons of untreated sewage into the River Thames. At the same in 
the background, of course, and getting no public recognition, the security and 
intelligence services continue their vigil, foiling various terrorist threats that may have 
manifested themselves in the deaths of small numbers of British citizens had they not 
been successfully disrupted. 
These disparate, seemingly unrelated, events combine to paralyse aspects of 
UK decision-making and hamper any kind of coordinated response as the country 
goes into crisis mode. 
 
Are we at war yet? 
Is this war? Obviously, not a shot has been fired, and there certainly does not 
immediately appear to be any hostile political intent guiding the combination of the 
week’s events. However, what if they had, in fact been initiated by a foreign power 
seeking to destabilise the UK - would this count as war? Given the effort, planning 
and resources that go into conventional military operations, the level of commitment 
to set up and launch a coordinated operation of this nature would be very small – a 
piece of information timed to be launched at a certain time, some fake reports leaked, 
data hacked and changed, a “whistle blower” contacting the press with compelling 
evidence, perhaps a credible but faked bomb threat to disrupt some high profile 
sporting event, a few vexatious legal challenges launched using perfectly legitimate 
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mechanisms in functioning democracies – nothing to rival the costs and potential risks 
of a conventional military operation, and yet the strategic effects could be 
considerable.20 But how should one respond?  
To add some context to the week above, what about if all of these apparently 
unrelated events begin to occur the week following a UK decision to commit military 
assets to reassure and protect Estonia under a NATO Article IV request for support. 
This request coming in the face of Russian military activity on the Estonian border 
and growing internal instability in Estonia sponsored and supported by as yet 
“unidentified external agents” - would that make a difference? With a lack of tangible 
proof about who was directing the actions, how is one supposed to respond? If it was 
later proved (or at least strongly suspected given the nature of the events) that some or 
all of these occurrences were actually instigated by the same foreign power would that 
be enough for this to be considered war, or do people actually have to die first? It 
seems intuitively wrong to think of this as war, certainly in the sense that we are used 
to considering the term. The foiled terrorist attacks and perhaps even the faked bomb 
threats might be considered to have crossed the violent attack threshold but this 
element seems to be almost token in relation to the overall effort rather than core even 
if it is connected with the same coordinating agent. 
It is the problems posed by such questions that have led some people such as 
Thomas Rid to argue that attacks of this nature (to be specific, he was referring to 
cyber attacks but I believe the logic can be extended to the range of acts above) 
should really not be considered acts of war. Rid argues that the term “Cyberwar” is a 
misnomer for three reasons, because, unlike real war; it does not involve actual 
violence or the threat of violence, it is not instrumental and it is not attributable. This 
is a powerful critique. Taking each in turn, Clausewitz, the philosopher of war, tells us 
that ‘War is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will’.21 Therefore, ‘if an act 
is not potentially violent, it is not an act of war’, at least as it has traditionally been 
understood.22 Clausewitz also tells us that “War is a mere continuation of politics by 
other means.”23 Therefore, acts of war are merely means employed towards achieving 
a political objective by forcing the other party to accept your terms. Finally, you have 
to know who you are at war with – ‘History does not know acts of war without 
eventual attribution.’24 Rid argues that due to the lack of the essential features war 
requires, even political (as opposed to merely criminal) cyber attacks or manipulations 
should not be considered as war at all. They may be more than simply criminal acts, 
but they fall short of what can be considered war, as would presumably the array of 
most if not all of the acts imagined in the scenario above. 
I have argued elsewhere why I believe this understanding is wrong, pointing 
out that these criteria can actually be met by some cyber-related threats, permitting 
them to be categorized as war in certain situations.25 For example, to take each point 
in turn, I would argue that demanding that physical violence is required seems to be 
an overly restrictive interpretation of an “act of war”, just as it would be to limit the 
definition of “assault” in a domestic jurisdiction. For example, in the UK, the legally-
accepted definition of assault does not require physical harm, or even the threat of 
physical harm to be satisfied.  The guidance also makes clear that psychological harm, 
including fear, distress or panic, can amount to Actual Bodily Harm.26 One can be 
coerced into doing something unwanted (i.e. change one’s policy if you like) through 
fear, an unequal power relationship, perceived authority or something else interfering 
with informed consent. This can still be regarded as an assault and therefore deserves 
to be regarded as a form of violence as a result.  An assault need not be physical to 
cause injury and there are clearly and demonstrably many injuries that are not 
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physical. Clausewitz himself argues that depending upon the character of the struggle 
one is involved with, for example ‘if our aim is only to obtain a single victory, in 
order to make the enemy insecure, to impress our greater strength upon him, and give 
him doubts about his future...we will employ no more strength than is absolutely 
necessary.27 In this case, if one can achieve the policy outcome without revealing 
one’s hand or committing to the high risk stakes of employing conventional armed 
force against a peer, that would appear to be both prudent and strategically sound. 
Secondly, if a government were on the receiving end of a few weeks of the 
kind of activity set out above, it might well be tempted to seek a compromise with an 
agent thought to be responsible – such actions could then be seen as a cyber version of 
the medieval chevauchée, an operation using devastation of property and molestation 
of people as its means designed to force an opposing lord into negotiations. Therefore, 
while the chevauchée was not recognised as war by many military medieval historians 
as it did not involve battles, that was exactly what it was – an instrument or means to 
bring about a favourable change in policy.28 Closely linked to the first point, it was 
precisely the moral injury that was so damaging in the medieval conception of the 
chevauchée because the lord who’s lands and people were being harmed was 
supposed to be able to protect them. Therefore, their demonstrable inability to do so 
undermined their authority leading to the need to reach a compromise agreement 
before the situation got even worse and the lord’s position became untenable. If a 
series of cyber attacks were intended to do the same through political pressure, surely, 
they too should be considered instrumental? 
 Finally, attribution appears to cause the most problems, both in terms of cyber 
attacks and in the type of hybrid attack outlined above. Even assuming the first two 
points are conceded, who are you to negotiate with if you don’t know who is attacking 
you? As I will explore further below, the attribution problem and what to do about it 
is one of the most challenging areas of military ethics.29 The nature of the cyber 
realm, or political subversion directed from afar, means that determining who is 
directing the activity is extremely challenging. However, surely it is not impossible 
that one can be under attack and still not know, or at least be able to prove, from who 
that attack was coming from? This is not a situation unique to the cyber realm, and in 
actuality, “attribution is often challenging even in circumstances of kinetic warfare, 
especially at sea.”30 Presumably, a genocidal surprise nuclear strike launched from 
concealed submarines would still be an act of war, even if no-one ‘owned up’ to it at 
the time?31 
I believe it is possible to conceive of a cyber and therefore a hybrid-attack that 
does not necessarily involve physical harm, death or destruction, but is carried out 
with a clear intent to achieve a political purpose, even if ownership of the attack was 
not admitted by any party. I believe that this could, if the consequences were serious 
enough, be considered war. Therefore, does this mean that the Just War Tradition can 
be helpful as a normative framework for this type of activity? In fact I would go as far 
as to argue that even if Rid and others are correct and this is not and should not be 
considered war at all, the Just War Tradition can still be a useful tool for gauging 
what responses might be appropriate when faced with receiving and defending against 
harm inflicted by others. 
 
The Just War Tradition and situations that may or may not be war 
To assume that the Just War Tradition cannot apply because the situation is not war as 
we understand it is to confuse what the purpose of the Tradition is in the first place. 
While historically the moral reasoning invoked was applied casuistically to war 
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(hence resulting in and evolving into what we call today the ‘Just War Tradition’), 
that reasoning contained in the Tradition could be (and often was) applied in a variety 
of other situations as well where one is seeking to do something that is, under normal 
circumstances, prohibited, i.e. deliberately cause harm to others. That harm, in war, is 
normally considered to be death or injury, but it is not necessarily limited to only 
these types of harm. The Just War Tradition, despite the name that it has taken on 
over the millennia, provides a structured approach to decision-making in such 
situations. 32  There is nothing novel about this. For example, in the Summa 
Theologica, Thomas Aquinas applied similar types of moral reasoning to a variety of 
practical moral conundrums, ranging from obedience to legal authority, to self-
defence, and to war. In the first of these, the default position is that one should obey 
the state, the ruler, the government etc. That is what makes civilised life possible. 
However, just occasionally, a regime may be ‘patently unjust or immoral’ and that 
might make disobedience or resistance permissible, or in extreme situations, even 
necessary. But, any argument for non-compliance must be based on a ‘grave and 
serious breach of moral propriety…what might be called a “just cause” for civil 
disobedience’.33  This would therefore represent an exception to what is normally 
permitted – i.e. provides a case where a normally established rule or moral principle 
may be justifiably set aside or violated.34 This is also precisely what the criteria within 
the Just War Tradition have evolved to address, in part, through a long-running 
dialogue between deontological (acts-based) and consequentialist (ends-based) 
reasoning, acknowledging that context must be taken into account when determining a 
correct course of action.35 
Even if a strategy does not fit into normal conceptions of war, but instead 
involves fomenting disobedience, undermining legitimate political processes, 
spreading false information, lying, deception, and sometimes the actual doing of 
harm, the reasoning found in the Just War Tradition can help. While it is not 
necessarily about providing a set of answers, ‘it can help to structure decision making 
as the factors it asks us to consider should be taken into account before and during any 
use of armed force’ or indeed act of harm.36 What happens if you try applying the Just 
War Tradition to situations that don’t necessarily look like war? 
The Just War Tradition demands that actions that can cause harm to others be 
undertaken only if there is a compelling, morally justifiable reason, that they are 
undertaken with the right intentions, authorised by those who have the legitimacy to 
sanction the suspension of the normal principles, that the harms that the action may 
produce in both the short and long term are proportional to what is at stake, has some 
prospect for success, and that there are not alternative options that may do less harm 
and still produce results, i.e. any harm inflicted is only done as a genuine last resort. 
In addition to these ad bellum requirements about whether an exception can be made, 
there are also certain in bello principles to guide the conduct of the exception itself. 
Specifically: discrimination to ensure that any harm brought about is really necessary, 
and that any harm to the innocent is limited and proportional to the legitimate aim 
being pursued. 
Working through the list (although the different elements must be considered 
in relationship with each other as a whole rather then just “ticked off” separately), if 
one’s actions are to be considered just, be they employing cyber, political, deceptive, 
subversive or conventional means (or combination thereof), they must have a just 
cause.  The clearest example of this is self-defence in response to an attack on one’s 
territory, but clearly the type of situation outlined above does not fit comfortably 
within this idea. There are debates about whether certain types of cyber attack at the 
The Monist 2016 99 (1): 55-69 doi: 10.1093/monist/onv029 
Dr David Whetham, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
more catastrophic end of the spectrum could be considered to have crossed the legally 
recognised threshold of armed attack.37 However, as long as one is taking into account 
the proportionality criteria below, whether or not it is an armed attack is irrelevant to 
the question “have I been harmed or injured in some way and do I have a right to 
respond to that harm?” That is not a question that demands interpretations about legal 
thresholds, but rather looks at the harm received or injury suffered.  
Does that mean that one can only respond justly once harm has been inflicted?  
It has long been recognised that some threats need to be anticipated if they are to be 
successfully defended against. That is even truer in an age where mass casualty 
terrorist attacks are being averted. As long as you genuinely believe that an attack is 
imminent, you don’t have to have been hit first before you can act. Indeed, if one had 
to accept a knock out blow before defending oneself, then that defence might well 
have been rendered irrelevant! However, whether acting as an individual or on behalf 
of a state or other political actor, treating every potential but un-actualised threat as if 
it is imminent because it might at some unspecified time in the future, become a 
threat, attacking in such circumstances ‘cannot be considered self-defence, either 
legally or morally’.38 Without getting this balance right, ‘preventive self-defence’ may 
amount to little more than felonious assault.39 Again, as above, it does not matter if 
the injury, or threat of harm is not physical as this question is simply to determine if 
the harm justifies a response – it does not determine what type of response is then 
appropriate at this stage. 
The classical formulation of the Just War Tradition requires that a declaration 
be made by a legitimate authority. In the contemporary environment, does it matter 
that the agent causing (or responding) to the harm may not be a state at all? Not at all 
– ‘in its ‘classical’ formulation, the Just War Tradition was not tied to any specific 
international arrangement or political paradigm’.40 Its classical origins long predates 
the Westphalian system of nation states we are familiar with today, and while the 
starting point for most Just War discussions starts today with a framework that owes 
much to Michael Walzer’s 1977 classic Just and Unjust Wars, and its ‘legalist 
paradigm’, there is no reason to restrict the agents involved to legally recognised 
states.41 The declaration element is often omitted but is also important for it is the 
means by which one signals why one is taking the actions being taken and what the 
other party or parties need to do to stop those actions, i.e. call a halt to hostilities. 
Normally, such a declaration will be public, perhaps even with a clear policy 
statement of what the state will do when faced with certain injuries, but there is no 
moral requirement for this declaration to be open to everyone, and the political 
environment may make backchannels more effective than grandstanding in many 
situations.  
But how can this be applicable to the forever war where the lines can blur to 
such an extent, and there may be no notification, formal or otherwise, to those 
involved, regardless of whether the opposing agent is a recognised state or not. 
Closely related to the previous criteria, surely having a just cause must involve 
knowing who has attacked you – you can’t really be at war when you don’t know who 
has attacked you? Again, we tend to treat this as something new but looking back in 
human history, it has often been difficult to know when one was at war or not. For 
example, in 1339, Sir Walter Manny rode ahead of news of the outbreak of war 
between England and France in order to take the town of Mortaigne by surprise. They 
were clearly not expecting his attack and Sir Walter quickly overcame the defences.42 
One could argue that something not too dissimilar happened at Pearl Harbor, but as 
pointed out above, regardless of the legitimacy of the attack on yourself, the idea that 
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you can’t be at war until you have worked out who is attacking you seems ridiculous 
in many different situations. What appears more likely is that you are under attack of 
some type, but do not know by whom – you do not know who you are at war with yet. 
In the cyber or largely non-kinetic hybrid war mentioned above, this lack of 
attribution makes anything other than passive defence (the cyber or social equivalents 
of shields, screens, walls or barriers) very difficult in moral terms. It might require 
months to determine the source of an attack and then one might still not be certain that 
this was the real culprit, which has further consequences (as discussed below). The 
controversy over the attribution of the cyber attacks on the media giant Sony in 2014 
and whether or not they really were North Korean in origin is a very public 
demonstration of how difficult things are in this area, even when they appear obvious 
at first.43  This is clearly a very different situation to conventional conflict where 
‘soldiers wear uniforms, and often the geography of an incident points to the identity 
of the organisation behind an intrusion’.44 Rid and Buchanan argue that successful (if 
perhaps not certain) attribution is possible, and that this requires a range of skills on 
all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent 
communication, and recognising limitations and challenges. Ultimately, when faced 
with the resources at the disposal of an advanced state which has decided to pursue 
the issue due to what is at stake, ‘attackers cannot assume that they can cause serious 
harm and damage under the veil of anonymity and get away with it’, even if this 
investigative process takes some time.45 
The spirit in which one acts  - one’s motivation - is generally considered 
important when judging the moral quality of an action. If one were to wait six months 
before responding to a threat, would that really be anything other than punishment, or 
even revenge? Could they be a sufficient motive for doing harm to others? 
Punishment in the face of injury was actually considered a moral duty in the Middle 
Ages. Law ‘came from God and represented the natural order of things’.46 When a 
wrong was committed, this meant that punishment had to be forthcoming for the 
injury to the moral order of things as well as for the injury to the specific individual or 
party. The Romans saw it more as a form of contract - ‘if the citizens of one state 
injured the citizens of another state in some way and they were not punished by their 
own state, then the whole state [instead] could be punished by war’.47 However, even 
when the line between punishment and revenge may have been somewhat blurred 
historically, today, pure revenge is very clearly not considered a legitimate 
motivation, 48  while punishment needs to be firmly grounded in terms of actions 
necessary to prevent an on-going threat. How can it be possible to respond weeks, 
months or even years after an attack, as might be required by the need to positively 
identify the culprit, and still claim that this is somehow an action taken in self-
defence? 
 This question, therefore, is inextricably linked to the principles of 
proportionality, prospect of success and last resort at the ad bellum level, but also 
reaching across to the in bello level. Last resort is the Just War Tradition’s necessity 
criteria – is there anything else that might work short of harming the other party – is 
this the only thing that has a prospect of working? Note that this does not require that 
the response is immediate to the initial harm, but rather, requires that there is nothing 
less damaging that can be done in order to prevent further harm or, if relevant, to 
return the situation to the status quo ante bellum. As long as the attacks are on going, 
or there is a credible fear that the attacks will continue at some point unless action is 
now taken against the newly identified actor, then this can still be in accordance with 
the last resort requirement. 
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In terms of proportionality, how significant is the harm that has been received 
or will be received if the on-going threat is not averted? What is therefore a 
proportionate response to that harm? Attacking one’s attacker back might not be 
necessary at all. Successful defence could mean simply imply thwarting an attack 
through blocking actions in a way that makes success too uncertain to be worth the 
investment, or it might require pre-emption, as discussed above.49 What this might 
mean in the cyber realm is going to be different to what it might mean in the political 
or legal realm, but note that the same broad ideas are still applicable, as is the 
importance of proportionality. If you do not want your information technology 
systems to be used against you maliciously, you ensure they are protected or, if they 
begin to malfunction, they can be shut down or disconnected. In the event of the civil, 
economic or legal structures that underpin western democratic states being 
manipulated or abused in a way that is intentionally damaging to those states, then 
having mechanisms in place to respond is just as important – from an ability to halt 
trading on your stock exchange in the face of false information being released that 
skews trading, or emergency legislation that can temporarily suspend a normal civil 
right or activity. Both situations demand that the response is proportional to the threat 
– you do not just suspend all civil liberties because an aspect of the judicial system is 
causing problems, no more than you would cut the internet connection to your own 
country to stop a fraudulent email from a fraudster in Nigeria seeking to get your bank 
details. 
Looking towards the source of the injury rather than inwards at more internal 
defensive responses, if the injury received is minor, or the risk of future harm is not 
considered significant, then perhaps criminal law or diplomatic sanction against the 
offending actor may be sufficient to avert on-going or future injury, or return the 
situation to the status quo ante bellum. However, if the overall harm is already 
significant despite the defensive measures in place, or there is reason to suspect that 
the injury will grow or escalate unless responded to robustly, then it is possible that a 
proportional response may require some form of counter attack. This may involve 
inflicting harm that is greater than the current level of injury received, including 
moving into the more traditional military sphere if justified - the response to a cyber 
attack, for example, need not necessarily be a cyber counter-attack. 50  It may be 
determined, in good faith and based on credible investigations uncovering a serious 
on going threat, that the only thing that will prevent further political, economic, 
social, or information attacks causing significant harm to the state with or without an 
overt military (whether conventional or irregular) component being present, is itself, a 
military response. However, whatever the form of the defensive act, be it political, 
diplomatic, cyber or military, and whether that response is immediate, or comes 
weeks or months later once the offending party has been appropriately identified, the 
response still needs to be proportional to the injury received or the threatened injury 
that is genuinely believed to be coming. 
 At the in bello level, whatever actions one takes in response to the injury 
suffered, the Just War Tradition demands that only those who are responsible for the 
harm may be directly targeted by whatever means is considered appropriate – the 
principle of discrimination (or distinction as it is known in legal terms). It also 
requires that any unintentional harm caused to those who are not culpable is 
minimised as far as possible. An illustration of what this might mean is the question 
whether or not to destroy a server through which a malicious attack has been 
launched, causing substantial financial damage and disrupting economic activity. The 
questions that need to be asked begin with will the action actually harm the actor 
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responsible for the attack and prevent them continuing the attack or launching another 
one? Who else will be harmed? Note, just as with the injury received, harm does not 
have to be considered as a purely physical thing. Data, records, financial service etc. 
could all be disrupted or destroyed by an attack. How culpable are the owners of the 
server - did they launch the attack, if not, did they facilitate or just fail to prevent the 
attack, should they have known about it if they were acting responsibly, or were they 
oblivious due to the steps taken by the attacker to cover their tracks? Clearly, the less 
culpable they are, they less liable they are to harm. What about all the other people 
that have data stored on the server, or rely on it for their livelihoods? Is the likely 
harm that they will suffer, unintentionally or not, proportionate to the anticipated 
benefit of the attack?51 If the attack on the server is deemed necessary, can the attack 
be carried out in a more discriminate way that only affects those who are culpable? 
These are just some of the questions that the in bello criteria should prompt in relation 
to any action that involves inflicting harm, lethal or not, intentionally or not, on 
others. 
  
Conclusion 
This paper cannot possibly hope to address every variation of the threats that states 
are faced with, nor every way in which the Just Tradition may be of relevance. The 
purpose was merely to firstly question what we commonly understand to be “war”, 
and secondly, to try and demonstrate that just because the title of the Tradition 
appears to limit its usefulness in the contemporary security environment, the moral 
reasoning it represents is actually a very useful set of criteria that can be applied in a 
much broader set of contexts than might initially be imagined. The less convincing the 
answers are to the questions posed by the Tradition when taken overall, or if one 
particular area represents obvious or profound problems, the harder it is to claim 
legitimacy for one’s actions. Were we were to disregard the Just War Tradition, and 
several millennia of structured thinking about the normative dimension of conflict in 
favour of something new and bespoke for the current age, we would predictably end 
by producing a very similar list of necessary conditions for justification anyway. The 
key questions the Tradition asks about things such as just cause, right intention, 
legitimate authority, last resort, and proportionality, are, at the very least, things that 
should be considered before breaking the ‘normal’ rules and consciously acting so as 
to harm others. In exactly the same way, we would also need to appeal to certain 
principles to guide the conduct of the exception, by seeking to limit the necessary 
harm to those who in some way have made themselves liable, and that any harm to 
innocent parties is nevertheless limited as far as possible and is proportional to what is 
trying to be achieved. 
 
                                                 
1 This article has developed out of the ideas articulated in: D Whetham and George R. 
Lucas, Jr.,‘The Relevance of the Just War Tradition to Cyber Warfare’, in James 
Green (Ed) Cyber Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Analysis (Routledge, 2015). 
2 D Whetham, Just Wars and Moral Victories: surprise, deception and the normative 
framework of European War in the later Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 36. 
3 Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister’s Address to the British People, 11.15am, 3rd 
September, 1939. 
4 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Society in Ancient Greece, trans. J. Lloyd (London: 
Methuen, 1992), 27. 
5 JT Johnson, The Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton 
The Monist 2016 99 (1): 55-69 doi: 10.1093/monist/onv029 
Dr David Whetham, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
                                                                                                                                            
University Press, 1981). 
6 R Sorabji and D Rodin (eds), The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different 
Traditions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 7. 
7 D Whetham, ‘The Just War Tradition: a Pragmatic Compromise’, in D Whetham 
(ed.) Ethics, Law and Military Operations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
65. 
8 Gates was quoting Colin Gray. See Robert M Gates, ‘A Balanced Strategy: 
Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb (2009). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy  
8 http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22753.aspx 
9 Russell W Glenn, ‘Thoughts on “Hybrid” Conflict, Small Wars Journal, March 
2009. 
10 Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, ‘Toward a Drone Accountability Regime’, 
Ethics & International Affairs, Vol 29, 1, Spring (2015), 16. 
11 Neta C Crawford, ‘Accountability for Targeted Drone Strikes Against Terrorists?’ 
Ethics & International Affairs, Vol 29, 1, Spring (2015), 39. 
12 T Rid, ‘Cyber war will not take place’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 
(2012), 7. 
13 Remarks by the President on Request to Congress for Authorization of Force 
Against ISIL, 11th Feb, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/11/remarks-president-request-congress-authorization-force-against-isil  
14 Spencer Ackerman, ‘Pentagon Spec Ops Chief Sees ‘10 to 20’ More Years of War 
Against Al-Qaida’, Wired, 16th May 2013 http://www.wired.com/2013/05/decades-of-
war/  
15 Robert M Gates, ‘A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 
Age’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb (2009). 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy  
16 http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22753.aspx  
17 Nicholas Watt, ‘David Cameron: ‘snoopers charter’ will reappear after Tory 
election win’, The Guardian 11th Jan 2015 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/11/david-cameron-snoopers-charter-
tory-election-win  
18 Rosa Brooks, ‘There’s No Such Thing as Peacetime’, Foreign Policy, 13 March 
(2015). 
19 For example, see David Whetham, ‘Drones and Targeted Killing: Angels or 
Assassins?’, in BJ Strawser (Ed), Killing by Remote Control: The Ethics of an 
Unmanned Military (Oxford: OUP June 2013). 
20 How could this be the case? Stored data can be manipulated and changed, then 
attention drawn to it triggering known protocols put in place to prevent societal harm 
– a risk averse culture means that action must be taken when the alarm is raised rather 
than waiting for the problem to grow and be beyond doubt. Social media can be 
mined for data linking individuals, reports can be fabricated and then subsequently 
denied, but it takes time to disprove apparently credible information targeted at the 
right outlet. NGOs, like all other institutions, need funding and some may be led in a 
certain direction by a concerned benefactor. Worker agitation is nothing new, and a 
prison population is particularly vulnerable to well placed rumours. International 
financial institutions have multiple interests in many countries, and of course, 
shareholders who can influence policy. 
21 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Berlin: Ullstein 1832, 1980), p.27. 
The Monist 2016 99 (1): 55-69 doi: 10.1093/monist/onv029 
Dr David Whetham, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
                                                                                                                                            
22 Rid, Cyber War, p.7. 
23 Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, p.44. 
24 Rid, Cyber War, p.8. 
25 The following argument is adapted from D Whetham, ‘Cyber Chevauchées: Cyber 
War Can Happen’, in BJ Strawser, Adam Henschke and Fritz Allhoff, Binary Bullets: 
The Ethics of Cyberwar (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
26 Crown Prosecution Service, Offences against the Person, incorporating the 
Charging Standard http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/offences_against_the_person/  
accessed 17 April 2015. 
27 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard, Peter Paret and   Bernard 
Brodie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 92. 
28 The medieval chevauchée could, on occasions, be used to try and get one’s 
opponent to commit to battle in order to prevent your activity, but this was rare in 
comparison to its use as a means to force a compromise agreement. See D Whetham, 
Just Wars and Moral Victories: surprise, deception and the normative framework of 
European War in the later Middle Ages (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
29 For example, see Bradley J Strawser (ed.), Journal of Military Ethics Special Issue 
on Cyberwar and Ethics, Vol. 12. No.1. April 2013. 
30 Yoram Dinstein, ‘Cyber War and International Law: Concluding Remarks at the 
2012 Naval War College International Law Conference’, International Law Studies, 
Vol 89, 2013, p.281. 
31 This and other arguments can be found in Whetham, ‘Cyber Chevauchées’. 
32 For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Whetham and Lucas, The Relevance of 
the Just War Tradition to Cyber Warfare. 
33 Ibid. 
34 George R. Lucas Jr., ‘Moral order and the constraints of agency: Toward a new 
metaphysics of morals’, in Neville, R.C. (ed.) New essays in metaphysics, (Albany:  
State University of New York Press, 1987). 
35 D Whetham, ‘Ethics, Law and Conflict’, in Whetham, Ethics, Law and Military 
Operations, 15. 
36 Whetham, ‘A Pragmatic Compromise’, in Whetham, Ethics, Law and Military 
Operations, 84. 
37 S Waterman, ‘U.S.-Israeli cyber attack on Iran was “act of force,” NATO study 
found’, 24 March 2013, The Washington Times [Online], 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/24/us-israeli-cyberattack-on-iran-
was-act-of-force-na/?page=all  
38 Whetham, ‘A Pragmatic Compromise’, in Whetham, Ethics, Law and Military 
Operations, 77. 
39 For a good discussion this area, see DK Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Preventive 
Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
40 Whetham and Lucas, The Relevance of the Just War Tradition to Cyber Warfare. 
41 M Walzer, Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations,  
2nd edition, (New York: Basic Books, 1992). See also Michael Gross, The Ethics of 
Insurgency: A Critical Guide to Just Guerrilla Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
42 Whetham, Just Wars and Moral Victories, 218. 
43 David E Sanger and Michael S Schmidt, ‘More Sanctions on North Korea After 
Sony Case’, The New York Times Jan 2, 2015.  
The Monist 2016 99 (1): 55-69 doi: 10.1093/monist/onv029 
Dr David Whetham, Department of Defence Studies, King’s College London 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/03/us/in-response-to-sony-attack-us-levies-
sanctions-on-10-north-koreans.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0  
44 Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 23 Dec (2014). 
45 Ibid. Others are less convinced. For example, see A Critical Review of Tom Rid 
and Ben Buchanan's "Attributing Cyber Attacks", Digital Dao, 6 Jan 2015. 
http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.co.uk/2015/01/a-critical-review-of-tom-rid-and-ben.html  
46 See Whetham, Just Wars and Moral Victories, 75. 
47 Ibid. 80. 
48 Whetham, A Pragmatic Compromise, 77. 
49 Lukasik suggests that defence will play ‘a larger role in cyber deterrence than in the 
nuclear case’, where defences were seen as destabilizing the nuclear balance. See 
Stephen J Lukasik, ‘A Framework for Thinking About Cyber Conflict and Cyber 
Deterrence with Possible Declaratory Policies for These Domains’, Proceedings of a 
Workshop on Deterring CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options 
for U.S. Policy (National Research Council, 2010), 102. 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12997.html 
50 For example, Clark and Landau argue that ‘deterrence must be achieved through the 
governmental tools of state, and not by engineering design’. See David D. Clark and 
Susan Landau, ‘Untangling Attribution’, Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring 
CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy (National 
Research Council, 2010), 40. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12997.html 
51 ‘[I]f the machine is an intermediary belonging to an innocent user, the degree of 
punishment (if it is allowed at all) must be carefully crafted to fit the crime.’ See 
Clark and Landau, Untangling Attribution, 37. 
